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SOLVING THE RIDDLE! BRIDGING THE GAP IN THE 
FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S DEFINITION OF  
“REGULAR AND ESTABLISHED PLACE OF BUSINESS” TO 
PREVENT PATENT TROLLS FROM FORUM SHOPPING 
Michael A. Morales* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Non-practicing entities, more commonly referred to as patent 
trolls, own patents and enforce them against other entities without 
practicing the underlying patented inventions themselves.1  Although 
this conduct complies with the United States patent laws, patent trolls 
manipulate and exploit many weaknesses in the system, such as 
threatening litigation to extract licensing fees and forum shopping to 
provide procedural litigation advantages.2  The differing opinions of 
the various district courts regarding venue disputes in patent 
infringement cases enable patent trolls to use forum shopping as a 
 
*J.D. Candidate 2019, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center; B.S. in Electrical and 
Computer Engineering, Worcester Polytechnic Institute.  I would like to give a special thanks 
to my wife, Kerry, for her infinite love and support throughout my law school career.  I would 
also like to thank my family and friends for motivating me to pursue my dreams and the Touro 
Law Review for allowing me to develop strong legal writing skills and electing me as the 
Editor-in-Chief for the 2018-2019 school year.  Last, but certainly not least, I would like to 
give a special thanks to my Notes Editor, Patryk Rogowski, and my faculty advisor, Professor 
Rena Seplowitz, for their endless support, encouragement, and guidance throughout the entire 
writing process. 
1  Edward Lee, Patent Trolls: Moral Panics, Motions in Limine, and Patent Reform, 19 
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 113, 115 (2015).  An entity practices an invention when it “makes, uses, 
offers to sell, or sells [its] patented invention, within the United States or imports into the 
United States [its] patented invention . . . .”  35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2016). 
2 Grace Heinecke, Pay the Troll Toll: The Patent Troll Model is Fundamentally at Odds 
with the Patent System’s Goals of Innovation and Competition, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 1153, 
1155 (2015).  “[P]atent trolls . . . use the patents to ‘extort some money’ from companies that 
actually make things.”  Kristen Osenga, Formerly Manufacturing Entities: Piercing the 
“Patent Troll” Rhetoric, 47 CONN. L. REV. 435, 435 (2014). 
1
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litigation weapon.3  The exploitation of the patent system causes 
companies to allocate resources to defensive litigation strategies 
instead of developing new technology and fostering innovation, which 
directly conflicts with Congress’s goal for implementing the patent 
system.4  Thus, it is no surprise that the overwhelming attitude among 
legal scholars towards patent trolls is that “[e]veryone seems to hate 
‘[them].’”5 
Although patent trolls have manipulated the United States 
patent system, one way to discourage and prevent them from 
exploiting the weaknesses in the system, and ultimately harming 
innovation, is through the combination of reasoned policy analysis and 
patent venue reform.6  For many years, the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Texas has provided a haven for patent trolls 
to bring patent infringement lawsuits because it tends to favor patent-
owners.7  Therefore, patent trolls typically file patent infringement 
lawsuits in the Eastern District of Texas instead of other more 
convenient districts to increase their likelihood of a favorable 
outcome.8  Such forum shopping, which is part of the patent troll 
business model, provides a litigation advantage to a party in a patent 
infringement lawsuit.9  
 
3 See Heinecke, supra note 2, at 1179-80. 
4 Heinecke, supra note 2.  Article I of the United States Constitution grants Congress the 
power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to 
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries[.]”  
U.S. CONST. art. 1 § 8, cl. 8. 
5 Osenga, supra note 2, at 437 (emphasis added). 
6 See Brian J. Love & James Yoon, Predictably Expensive: A Critical Look at Patent 
Litigation in the Eastern District of Texas, 20 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 35 (2017); see also 
Osenga, supra note 2, at 438. 
7 Patrick H.J. Hughes, Attorneys Weigh in on Impact of Federal Circuit Patent Venue 
Ruling, WESTLAW INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DAILY BRIEFING, Sept. 28, 2017, 2017 WL 
4295782.  In fact, “East Texas saw more patent suits since 2014 than the districts that contain 
California’s Silicon Valley, Massachusetts’ Route 128, Detroit’s Automation Alley, Illinois’ 
Golden Corridor, and North Carolina’s Research Triangle.”  Love & Yoon, supra note 6, at 7.  
According to Lex Machina, between 2014 and mid-2016, the Eastern District of Texas saw 
4,736 patent suits, while the Northern District of California saw 595 patent suits, the District 
of Massachusetts saw 154, the Eastern District of Michigan saw 159, the Northern District of 
Illinois saw 448, and the Middle and Eastern Districts of North Carolina collectively saw 79.  
Love & Yoon, supra note 6, at 7 n.22. 
8 Love & Yoon, supra note 6, at 7. 
9 Patrick H.J. Hughes, Supreme Court Might End Texas’ Preferred Patent Venue Status, 
Attorneys Say (U.S.), WESTLAW INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DAILY BRIEFING, Dec. 20, 2016, 
2016 WL 7362601 (citing Brief of Amici Curiae 56 Professors of Law and Economics in 
Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari, TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 
137 S. Ct. 1514 (2017) (No. 16–341), 2017 WL 510981, at *9 (explaining that “[w]hile forum 
2
Touro Law Review, Vol. 34 [2018], No. 2, Art. 14
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol34/iss2/14
2018 PATENT TROLLS AND FORUM SHOPPING 571 
This Note will argue that courts should apply venue law in a 
manner that limits a litigant’s ability to forum shop for a favorable 
forum, such as the Eastern District of Texas, in patent infringement 
lawsuits.  This Note will propose several factors that courts should use 
to determine whether a party has filed a patent infringement lawsuit in 
a proper venue according to the patent venue statute.10  It will explain 
why each factor limits a patent troll’s ability to forum shop, thereby 
fostering innovation and supporting Congress’s goal for implementing 
the patent system.11 
This Note will be divided into nine sections.  Section II will 
provide an overview of the application of the patent venue statute.  
Section III will explain Congress’s intent when it enacted the patent 
venue statute.  Section IV will discuss the Federal Circuit’s analysis of 
the regular and established place of business requirement for venue 
purposes, including a discussion of its decisions in In re Cordis Corp.12 
and In re Cray Inc.13  Section V will analyze factual considerations 
that courts should use to determine whether a defendant has a physical 
place of business in a district within the meaning of the Federal 
Circuit’s definition.  Section VI will discuss facts that courts should 
consider to determine whether a defendant’s place of business is 
regular.  Section VII will evaluate factual considerations that courts 
should use to determine whether a defendant’s place of business is 
established.  Section VIII will analyze factual inquiries that courts 
should consider in addition to the Federal Circuit’s factors presented 
in In re Cray.  Finally, Section IX will conclude that the courts should 
apply venue law uniformly to prevent patent trolls from forum 
shopping.  
II.  OVERVIEW OF THE APPLICATION OF THE PATENT VENUE 
STATUTE 
Venue for patent infringement cases is codified in 28 U.S.C. § 
1400(b),14 which provides that “[a]ny civil action for patent 
 
shopping in general impairs the operation of law, disadvantages those who lack the resources 
to engage in forum shopping, and creates economic waste, . . . the rise of the troll business 
model exacerbates these problems in patent litigation . . . .” (citation omitted))). 
10 See discussion of factual considerations infra Sections V-VIII. 
11 See U.S. CONST. art. 1 § 8, cl. 8. 
12 769 F.2d 733 (Fed. Cir. 1985).  See discussion of this case infra Section IV(A). 
13 871 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  See discussion of this case infra Section IV(B)(2). 
14 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (2016). 
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infringement may be brought in the judicial district where the 
defendant resides, or where the defendant has committed acts of 
infringement and has a regular and established place of business.”15  
For over twenty-five years, in accordance with the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s decision in VE Holding Corp. v. 
Johnson Gas Appliance Co.,16 courts consistently held that a defendant 
resided in any judicial district where the defendant is subject to the 
court’s personal jurisdiction.17  Therefore, under this interpretation of 
the patent venue law, patent trolls forum shopped for patent-owner 
friendly forums, such as the Eastern District of Texas, merely by 
arguing that the court had personal jurisdiction over the defendant.18 
On May 22, 2017, the United States Supreme Court handed 
down its decision in TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group Brands 
LLC,19 in which it held that a defendant resides only in its state of 
incorporation.20  Under this change in the law, a defendant corporation 
resides in any judicial district in its state of incorporation rather than 
in any judicial district where the defendant is subject to the court’s 
personal jurisdiction.21  Therefore, in the wake of TC Heartland, if a 
defendant corporation is not incorporated in the state in which a 
plaintiff files a patent infringement lawsuit, then a court must establish 
a proper venue by determining where the defendant corporation has 
 
15 Id. (emphasis added). 
16 917 F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1990), abrogated by TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. 
Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514 (2017). 
17 VE Holding, 917 F.2d at 1580 (explaining that 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) supplemented § 
1400(b) and, for venue purposes in patent infringement cases, a court is a proper venue if the 
court has personal jurisdiction over the parties).  General venue provisions are codified in 28 
U.S.C. § 1391(c), which provides that “an entity with the capacity to sue and be sued in its 
common name under applicable law, whether or not incorporated, shall be deemed to reside, 
if a defendant, in any judicial district in which such defendant is subject to the court’s personal 
jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question . . . .”  28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2) (2016) 
(emphasis added). 
18 The Eastern District of Texas’s popularity stems from its reputation for cases proceeding 
to trial quickly, which in turn allows plaintiffs to recover damages faster while placing greater 
pressure on defendants to settle.  Love & Yoon, supra note 6, at 13.  In addition, the Eastern 
District of Texas is home to judges and jurors who are unusually sympathetic to plaintiffs.  
Love & Yoon, supra note 6, at 15.  The Eastern District of Texas’s popularity also stems from 
the combined effect of a number of marginal procedural advantages, including the relative 
timing of discovery, rulings on procedural motions, and judicial scrutiny of infringement 
claims.  Love & Yoon, supra note 6, at 21. 
19 137 S. Ct. 1514 (2017). 
20 Id. at 1521 (holding that 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) does not supplement 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) 
for patent venue purposes). 
21 Id.  See also In re Micron Tech., Inc., 875 F.3d 1091, 1094 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (stating “[w]e 
conclude that TC Heartland changed the controlling law . . . .”). 
4
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committed acts of infringement and has a regular and established place 
of business in a judicial district.22  The Supreme Court’s decision in 
TC Heartland reined in patent trolls and limited their ability to forum 
shop.23 
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in TC Heartland, courts 
rarely determined whether a defendant had a regular and established 
place of business in a judicial district because, relying on the Federal 
Circuit’s holding in VE Holding, courts often determined a proper 
venue based on where the defendant resided.24  Therefore, a large gap 
in the law existed for determining whether a defendant had a regular 
and established place of business in a judicial district.25  For over thirty 
years, district courts struggled to apply venue law uniformly in 
accordance with the Federal Circuit’s decision in In re Cordis, the 
Federal Circuit’s only decision which provided guidance on the 
issue.26  In the recent decision of In re Cray, the Federal Circuit 
analyzed the statutory framework of the “regular and established place 
of business” requirement of the patent venue statute and provided 
guidance for courts to use going forward.27  
In In re Cray, the Federal Circuit held that there are three 
general requirements to determine whether a defendant corporation has 
a regular and established place of business in a judicial district.28  First, 
there must be a physical place of business in the district.29  Second, the 
 
22 See 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (2016). 
23 See Larry Downes, The U.S. Supreme Court Is Reining in Patent Trolls, Which Is a Win 
for Innovation, HARV. BUS. REV. (June 2, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/06/the-u-s-supreme-
court-is-reining-in-patent-trolls-which-is-a-win-for-innovation. 
24 In re Cray, Inc., 871 F.3d 1355, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (explaining that venue in patent 
infringement cases has largely turned on whether a defendant resides in the district in 
question). 
25 Id. (discussing that district courts have noted the uncertainty surrounding and the need 
for greater uniformity on the issue of whether a defendant has a regular and established place 
of business). 
26 Id. (citing In re Cordis, 769 F.2d at 736-37).  The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction “of an appeal from a final decision of a district court 
of the United States . . . in any civil action arising under . . . any Act of Congress relating to 
patents . . . .”  28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2016).  Congress formed the Federal Circuit to clear up 
existing conflicts in the patent law decisions of the circuit courts of appeals and to develop a 
body of law to instruct district courts in the proper application of the patent laws.  Donald R. 
Dunner, The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: Its Critical Role in the 
Revitalization of U.S. Patent Jurisprudence, Past, Present, and Future, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 
775, 781 (2010).  See discussion of the Federal Circuit infra Section IV. 
27 See generally In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1355. 
28 Id. at 1360. 
29 Id. 
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physical place of business must be regular and established.30  Third, 
the regular and established place of business must be the place of the 
defendant.31  In this case, the Federal Circuit found that the facts did 
not support a finding that Cray had a place of business under the third 
requirement because there was no indication that Cray owned, leased, 
or rented any portion of its sales executives’ homes in the judicial 
district.32  Although this case is very helpful in guiding district courts 
to apply venue law uniformly, the court did not specifically apply the 
first two requirements to the facts of the case.33  In contrast with the 
third requirement, the court did not discuss factors that courts should 
use to determine whether the place of business is “physical,” “regular,” 
and “established.”34  As such, with district courts attempting to resolve 
venue disputes in the wake of TC Heartland, it has become 
increasingly necessary for courts to uniformly determine whether a 
defendant corporation has a physical, regular, and established place of 
business in a district. 
Regarding the physical place of business requirement, courts 
should consider whether a defendant operates solely through virtual 
means.35  Courts should also consider whether a defendant has a stand-
alone business office or employs a secretarial service in the district.36  
On the other hand, whether a defendant registers as a foreign 
corporation or appoints an agent to accept service of process should 
not be factored into a court’s analysis.37 
Regarding the regular and established requirements, courts 
should split the analysis for regular place of business from the analysis 
for established place of business because the Federal Circuit defined 
 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1366. See discussion of facts infra Section IV(B)(2).  
33 See In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1366. 
34 Id. at 1362-64. 
35 See analysis of this factor infra Section V (A).  Although courts have not specifically 
analyzed the phrase “virtual means” for patent venue purposes, courts hesitate to find that a 
defendant has a regular and established place of business in a district if the defendant sells 
products or services through online stores only.  See Talsk Research Inc. v. Evernote Corp., 
No. 16-CV-2167, 2017 WL 4269004, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 26, 2017).  This result is proper 
because the Federal Circuit has determined that the place of business must be a physical, 
geographical location in the district from which the defendant conducts business.  See In re 
Cray, 871 F.3d at 1362. 
36 See analysis of this factor infra Section V(B). 
37 See analysis of this factor infra Section V(C).  Consideration of these factors conflates 
the issues of venue with personal jurisdiction.  See In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1361. 
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the terms “regular” and “established” differently.38  To determine 
whether a defendant has a regular place of business in a district, courts 
should consider how long the defendant has spent in the district as well 
as the number of times per year that the defendant spends in the district 
conducting business.39  To determine whether a defendant has an 
established place of business in a district, courts should consider the 
defendant’s revenue generated in the district, the time that the 
defendant has spent in the district, and the number of employees that 
the defendant has employed in the district.40  On the other hand, courts 
should not evaluate whether the defendant’s employees service 
customers at the customer’s location.41 
Regarding the defendant’s place of business requirement, in 
addition to the requirements that the Federal Circuit discussed in In re 
Cray, courts should also consider whether the place of business in 
question is the place of the defendant or the defendant’s subsidiary.42  
On the other hand, whether the defendant lists its employee’s home as 
the place of business on a worker’s compensation insurance policy 
should not be factored into a court’s analysis.43  Although a defendant 
might store its products in its employee’s home, courts should not 
consider this factor to be determinative.44 
Courts should continue to rein in patent trolls by uniformly 
applying patent venue law to prevent them from using forum shopping 
as a litigation advantage.  Companies sued by patent trolls must 
allocate resources to defensive strategies–funds that otherwise could 
be spent on developing technology instead of threatened litigation.45  
Without litigation spending, companies can invest more in research 
and development to create new patentable inventions, thereby 
 
38 See In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1362-63 (defining regular as “‘steady[,] uniform[,] orderly[, 
and] methodical’ manner” and defining established as “settle[d] certainly, or fix[ed] 
permanently”).  Courts should split the analysis to avoid redundancy and conflating the 
requirements of each term because the Federal Circuit has defined the terms separately. 
39 See analysis of this factor infra Section VI(A)-VI(B). 
40 See analysis of this factor infra Section VII(B), VII(E). 
41 See analysis of this factor infra Section VII(C).  A court should find that the defendant’s 
business is not established in the district if the defendant leaves the district because its presence 
is not fixed permanently.  See analysis of this factor infra Section VII(A). 
42 See analysis of this factor infra Section VIII(B). 
43 See analysis of this factor infra Section VIII(C). 
44 See analysis of this factor infra Section VIII(A).  See discussion of In re Cray infra 
Section IV(B)(2). 
45 Heinecke, supra note 2, at 1179-80. 
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fostering innovation.46  Under the analysis set forth in In re Cray, 
district courts have wide discretion for determining a proper venue 
because the Federal Circuit left large gaps in its analysis of the patent 
venue laws.47  These gaps permit district courts to have varying 
opinions regarding whether a defendant has a physical, regular, and 
established place of business in the district at issue.48  The differing 
opinions of the various district courts enable patent trolls to exploit the 
patent system and use forum shopping as a litigation weapon, thereby 
continuing to harm innovation.49  By utilizing the factors analyzed in 
this Note, courts can begin to apply patent venue law uniformly to 
prevent patent trolls from exploiting this prevalent weakness in our 
judicial system. 
III. 28 U.S.C. 1400(B)’S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND 
CONGRESS’S INTENT WHEN IT ENACTED THE “REGULAR 
AND ESTABLISHED PLACE OF BUSINESS” REQUIREMENT 
In the late 1800s, when Congress was considering § 1400(b)’s 
predecessor,50 courts were divided over whether a defendant could be 
sued for patent infringement outside the place of defendant’s 
incorporation.51  To resolve the uncertainty, Congress enacted § 
1400(b)’s predecessor in 1897 to permit suit in the district of which the 
defendant was an “inhabitant” or in which the defendant both 
maintained a “regular and established place of business” and 
committed an act of infringement.52  The statute’s main purpose was 
 
46 Heinecke, supra note 2, at 1180. 
47 As mentioned, the Federal Circuit’s analysis in In re Cray guided courts, but it failed to 
provide specific factual considerations that courts should use to determine if the defendant’s 
place of business in a district is physical, regular, and established.  See generally In re Cray, 
871 F.3d at 1355. 
48 See discussion of the shortcomings of the Federal Circuit’s test infra Section IV(B)(2). 
49 See Heinecke, supra note 2, at 1179-80. 
50 Act of Mar. 3, 1897, ch. 395, 29 Stat. 695 (1897) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 
1400(b)). 
51 In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1360.  Compare id. at 1360-61 (explaining that some courts held 
that plaintiffs must bring suit in the defendant’s place of incorporation because “it is very 
inconvenient to travel across the continent to sue them when they are infringing in a business 
established near the plaintiff or owner of a patent.” (quoting 29 CONG. REC. 2695, 2719 (1897) 
(statement by Sen. Platt)), with id. at 1361 (explaining that “[o]ther courts instead held that 
[patent] infringement ‘suit[s] may be brought wherever service can be had.’” (quoting 29 
CONG. REC. 1871, 1900 (1897) (statement of Rep. Mitchell)). 
52 Act of Mar. 3, 1897, ch. 395, 29 Stat. 695 (1897) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 
1400(b)). 
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to “give original jurisdiction to the court where a permanent agency 
transacting the business [was] located.”53  Jurisdiction would not be 
conferred by “[i]solated cases of infringement,” but “only where a 
permanent agency [was] established.”54 
The Federal Circuit in In re Cray noted that “Congress adopted 
the predecessor to § 1400(b) as a special venue statute in patent 
infringement actions to eliminate the ‘abuses engendered’ by previous 
venue provisions allowing such suits to be brought in any district in 
which the defendant could be served.”55  The legislation was “intended 
to define the exact limits of venue in patent infringement suits.”56  The 
Supreme Court therefore has explained that Congress enacted the 
statute as “a restrictive measure, limiting a prior, broader venue.”57  
The Supreme Court has also instructed that venue requirements are 
specific and unambiguous and that courts should not give them a 
liberal construction.58 
IV.  APPLICATION OF “REGULAR AND ESTABLISHED PLACE OF 
BUSINESS” IN FEDERAL COURTS 
Prior to the formation of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit, appellate review of patent cases took place in the 
eleven different circuit courts of appeals.59  The circuit courts’ widely 
varying views of the patent laws encouraged patent litigators to race to 
the courthouses of their choice in order to position their clients in the 
circuit court most friendly to their clients’ interests.60  This behavior 
resulted in “an extremely inefficient and unfair administration of 
justice in the patent law area, not to mention the total unpredictability 
of patent jurisprudence, contingent on who reached the courthouse 
first.”61  Therefore, in the early 1980s, Congress formed the Federal 
Circuit to clear up existing conflicts in the patent law decisions of the 
 
53 In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1361 (quoting 29 CONG. REC. 1871, 1900 (1897) (statement of 
Rep. Lacey)). 
54 Id. (quoting 29 CONG. REC. 1871, 1900 (1897) (statement of Rep. Lacey)). 
55 Id. (quoting Schnell v. Peter Eckrich & Sons, Inc., 365 U.S. 260, 262 (1961)). 
56 Id. (quoting Stonite Prods. Co. v. Melvin Lloyd Co., 315 U.S. 561, 566 (1942)). 
57 Id. (quoting Stonite, 315 U.S. at 566). 
58 In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1361 (citing Schnell, 365 U.S. at 264). 
59 Dunner, supra note 26, at 777. 
60 Dunner, supra note 26, at 777. 
61 Dunner, supra note 26, at 777. 
9
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circuit courts of appeals and to develop a body of law to instruct district 
courts in the proper application of the patent laws.62 
In 1985, In re Cordis was the Federal Circuit’s first decision 
addressing the issue of whether a defendant corporation has a regular 
and established place of business in a judicial district.63  However, In 
re Cordis is viewed as merely persuasive, rather than authoritative, 
because of its unique procedural posture and its focus on one fact in 
the countless combinations of relevant factors.64  The Federal Circuit 
recently rendered another decision in In re Cray to help district courts 
determine whether a defendant corporation has a regular and 
established place of business in a judicial district.65  This section will 
discuss and analyze the Federal Circuit’s decisions in In re Cordis and 
In re Cray and the shortcomings of each case. 
A. Federal Circuit’s Determination that a Defendant 
Corporation has a Regular and Established Place of 
Business if it has a “Continuous and Permanent 
Presence” in the District 
In In re Cordis, Medtronic Inc., a Minnesota corporation with 
its principal place of business in Minneapolis, filed a complaint in the 
United States District Court for the District of Minnesota alleging that 
Cordis Corp., a Florida corporation with its principal place of business 
in Miami, infringed four of Medtronic’s patents.66  Cordis filed a 
motion to dismiss for improper venue under Rule 12(b)(3) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on the ground that Cordis did not 
have a regular and established place of business in the District of 
Minnesota.67  However, the district court denied Cordis’s motion to 
dismiss.68 
 
62 Dunner, supra note 26.  The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has 
exclusive jurisdiction “of an appeal from a final decision of a district court of the United States 
. . . in any civil action arising under . . . any Act of Congress relating to patents . . . .”  28 
U.S.C. 1295(a)(1) (2016). 
63 In re Cordis, 769 F.2d at 736.   
64 Ron Vogel & Brian Coggio, Reviving ‘Regular And Established Place Of Biz’ Case Law, 
LAW 360 (June 12, 2017, 1:28 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/930354/reviving-
regular-and-established-place-of-biz-case-law (explaining that the case’s procedural posture 
was unique because of the extraordinary nature of mandamus). 
65 See generally In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1355. 
66 In re Cordis, 769 F.2d at 734. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
10
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The district court found that Cordis employed two full-time 
sales representatives, who worked exclusively for Cordis to market the 
company’s pacemakers in Minnesota.69  The two sales representatives 
maintained their offices in their homes where they stored Cordis’s 
literature, documents, and products.70  Furthermore, they acted as 
technical consultants who were present in the operating room during a 
significant number of surgical implantations of Cordis’s pacemakers, 
provided post-implantation consultations, and gave small 
presentations regarding technological developments.71  Cordis also 
engaged a Minnesota secretarial service to receive messages, provide 
typing services, mail Cordis’s literature, and receive shipments of 
Cordis’s sales literature.72  The Minnesota telephone directory 
included Cordis’s name, telephone number and address.73  However, 
Cordis was not registered to do business in Minnesota, did not have a 
bank account within the state, and did not own or lease an office space 
within the state.74   
The district court denied Cordis’s motion to dismiss and found 
that Cordis maintained a regular and established place of business in 
Minnesota even though the two sales representatives did not perform 
their sales functions from a fixed, physical location.75  Cordis 
challenged the district court’s finding because it did not rent or own a 
fixed physical location within Minnesota.76  Cordis petitioned the 
Federal Circuit to issue a writ of mandamus to order the District of 
Minnesota to transfer the case to a proper venue.77  Pursuant to the All 
Writs Act,78 the Federal Circuit had the authority to issue the requested 
writ as “necessary or appropriate in aid of [its jurisdiction].”79  
However, “[t]he use of mandamus is limited to exceptional 
 
69 Id. at 735. 
70 Id. 
71 In re Cordis, 769 F.2d at 735. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 737. 
76 In re Cordis, 769 F.2d at 734. 
77 Id. 
78 All Writs Act, ch. 139, 63 Stat. 102 (1949) (codified as amended in 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a)). 
79 In re Cordis, 769 F.2d at 736 (quoting Miss. Chem. Corp. v. Swift Agric. Chems. Corp., 
717 F.2d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). 
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circumstances to correct a ‘clear abuse of discretion or “usurpation of 
judicial power”’ by a trial court.”80 
The Federal Circuit relied heavily on the decisions of the Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Phillips v. Baker81 and the Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in University of Illinois Foundation v. 
Channel Master Corp.82 to determine that Cordis had a regular and 
established place of business in Minnesota.83  The court reasoned that 
these cases indicated that the “appropriate inquiry is whether the 
corporate defendant does its business in a district through a permanent 
and continuous presence” and not whether the corporate defendant has 
a “fixed physical presence in the sense of a formal office or store.”84  
If a “rational and substantial legal argument can be made in support of 
the rule in question, the case is not appropriate for mandamus, even 
though on normal appeal, a court might find reversible error.”85  The 
court found that Medtronic made a rational and substantial legal 
argument in support of the district court’s order to deny Cordis’s 
motion to dismiss for lack of proper venue.86 
The Federal Circuit used a clear abuse of discretion standard of 
review because Cordis petitioned the Federal Circuit to issue a writ of 
mandamus to order the district court to transfer the case to a proper 
venue.87  If Cordis had instead appealed the case after the district 
court’s decision on the merits, the outcome might have been different 
because the Federal Circuit would have likely reviewed the appeal 
using a de novo standard.88  If the case had been reviewed de novo, the 
 
80 Id. (citing Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379 (1953) (quoting De 
Beers Consol. Mines v. United States, 325 U.S. 212 (1945))). 
81 121 F.2d 752 (9th Cir. 1941).  See discussion of the case infra Section VI(A). 
82 382 F.2d 514 (7th Cir. 1967).  
83 In re Cordis, 769 F.2d at 736-37. 
84 Id. at 737 (emphasis added). 
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. at 736. 
88 See In re Cordis, 769 F.2d at 737.  When legal error is at issue, the standard of review is 
de novo, and the Federal Circuit gives the trial court little, if any, deference as to any 
presumption of legal correctness.  Kevin Casey et al., Standards of Appellate Review in the 
Federal Circuit: Substance and Semantics, 11 FED. CIR. B. J. 279, 285 (2002) (citing Superior 
Fireplace Co. v. Majestic Prods. Co., 270 F.3d 1358, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Cybor Corp. v. 
FAS Tech., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Tex. Instruments Inc. v. Cypress 
Semiconductor Corp., 90 F.3d 1558, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).  The most lenient standard of 
review is abuse of discretion, which “may be found when: (1) the tribunal’s decision is clearly 
unreasonable, arbitrary, or fanciful; (2) the decision was based on an erroneous conclusion of 
law; (3) the tribunal’s findings are clearly erroneous; or (4) the record contains no evidence 
12
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court might have analyzed the issue further.  Instead of explaining that 
the appropriate inquiry is whether a defendant has a permanent and 
continuous presence in a district,89 the court might have set forth a 
comprehensive framework for determining whether a defendant has a 
regular and established place of business in a district.  The Federal 
Circuit’s decision failed to apply its new rule of law from In re Cordis 
to the facts because it did not specifically explain how Cordis’s actions 
in the district amounted to a continuous and permanent presence 
there.90  It would have been more helpful for the court to go beyond 
simply explaining its rule of law by applying the rule of law to the facts 
and discussing its reasoning for doing so.  Instead, the court left it up 
to the district courts in future cases to determine whether a defendant 
conducts its business in a district through a permanent and continuous 
presence.91  Consequently, district courts have struggled to apply the 
Federal Circuit’s new rule of law uniformly.92 
B. Federal Circuit Defines a Regular and Established 
Place of Business but Leaves Gaps in its Analysis 
In Raytheon Co. v. Cray Inc.,93 the defendant filed a motion to 
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue, but the 
court denied the motion finding that the defendant had a regular and 
established place of business in the judicial district based on Judge 
Gilstrap’s newly created four factor test.94  After the court denied the 
defendant’s motion to dismiss, Cray petitioned the Federal Circuit to 
 
upon which the tribunal rationally could have based its decision.”  Id. at 286 (citing Abrutyn 
v. Giovanniello, 15 F.3d 1048, 1050-51 (Fed. Cir. 1994); W. Elec. Co. v. Piezo Tech., Inc., 
860 F.2d 428 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Heat & Control, Inc. v. Hester Indus., Inc., 785 F.2d 1017 (Fed. 
Cir. 1986)). 
89 See In re Cordis, 769 F.2d at 737. 
90 See id. at 736-37. 
91 See generally id. at 733. 
92 Compare Holub Indus., Inc. v. Wyche, 290 F.2d 852, 853 (4th Cir. 1961) (suggesting that 
a prerequisite to being considered a regular and established place of business is that the 
defendant must have a physical presence, such as an office or warehouse, in the district), with 
Mastantuono v. Jacobsen Mfg. Co., 184 F. Supp. 178, 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (requiring that the 
defendant must regularly engage “in carrying on a substantial part of its ordinary business on 
a permanent basis in a physical location within the district over which it exercises some 
measure of control.”). 
93 258 F. Supp. 3d 781 (E.D. Tex. 2017), vacated by In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1357. 
94 Raytheon, 258 F. Supp. 3d at 799.  See discussion of Judge Gilstrap’s factor test infra 
Section IV(B)(1). 
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issue a writ of mandamus to order the Eastern District of Texas to 
transfer the case.95   
1.  Raytheon Co. v. Cray, Inc.: The District 
Court Opinion 
Cray had one sales executive working in the Eastern District of 
Texas for more than seven years and listed the sales executive as the 
“Named Account Manager” there.96  In addition, the sales executive 
listed his telephone number on Cray’s invoices to customers and 
emails to clients, and the telephone number’s area code was associated 
with several counties in the Eastern District of Texas.97  The revenue 
attributed to the sales executive exceeded $345 million, and the sales 
executive received reimbursement for his cellphone used for business 
purposes, internet fees, mileage and various costs he incurred for 
business travel.98  Unlike Cordis in In re Cordis, Cray did not pay for 
any secretarial staff in the district; rather, the sales executive received 
direct administrative support from Cray’s Minnesota office to allow 
the sales executive to continue to work from his home office in the 
Eastern District of Texas.99  
Before the Federal Circuit’s decision in VE Holding, most 
courts had developed competing and conflicting interpretations of the 
regular and established place of business element of § 1400(b).100  One 
line of cases held, or at least suggested, that an established place of 
business required a physical presence in the district.101  In fact, some 
of these courts held that the physical presence needed to be on land 
that the defendant owned, leased, or controlled.102  Other courts 
required that the physical presence be a “substantial part” of the 
defendant’s business.103  The other line of cases found that proper 
venue did not require a physical presence in the district but that a 
 
95 In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1356. 
96 Raytheon, 258 F. Supp. 3d at 785. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. at 792 (explaining that in Johnston v. IVAC Corp., 681 F. Supp. 959, 962 (D. Mass. 
1987), courts hoped for greater uniformity after the creation of the Federal Circuit). 
101 Raytheon, 258 F. Supp. 3d at 792 (citing Holub, 290 F.2d at 853, Gen. Radio Co. v. 
Superior Elec. Co., 293 F.2d 949 (1st Cir. 1961), and Phillips, 121 F.2d at 752). 
102 Id. (citing Johnston, 681 F. Supp. at 962). 
103 Id.  See Mastantuono, 184 F. Supp. at 178.  See also Coleco Indus., Inc. v. Kransco Mfg., 
Inc., 247 F. Supp. 571, 574 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). 
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defendant’s employee, operating out of his or her home, could 
constitute a regular and established place of business.104 
In light of the courts’ split in applying patent venue law, Judge 
Gilstrap created a four factor test to help courts ascertain coverage 
under the statutory scheme.105  His test included determining the extent 
to which (1) “a defendant has a physical presence in the district,”106 (2) 
“a defendant represents that it has a presence in the district,”107 (3) “a 
defendant derives benefits from its presence in the district,”108 and (4) 
“a defendant interacts in a targeted way with entities in the district.”109  
He explained that his test did not supplant the statutory language of § 
1400(b) and stated that none of the factors should alone be 
dispositive.110  He opined that courts should consider other realities 
present in individual cases based upon fair consideration of the totality 
of the circumstances and not by a bright-line test.111  Although Judge 
Gilstrap discussed each of the four factors of his test, he did not apply 
each factor to the facts of Raytheon or explain how each factor weighed 
 
104 Raytheon, 258 F. Supp. 3d at 792 (citing Brunswick Corp. v. Suzuki Motor Co., 575 F. 
Supp. 1412, 1424 (E.D. Wis. 1983) and Instrumentation Specialties Co. v. Waters Assocs., 
Inc., No. 76 C 4340, 1977 WL 22810, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 12, 1977)). 
105 Id. at 795-96.  Although district courts typically interpret Federal Circuit opinions for 
patent venue disputes, seeing an opportunity to revitalize a dormant area of patent venue 
jurisprudence, Judge Gilstrap created the new test to “employ analytical methods for 
establishing patent venue which are rooted in the wisdom of the past, but which also embrace 
the future’s changes.”  Id. at 799. 
106 Id. at 796-97 (explaining that “[a]t the most basic level, a retail store, warehouse, or other 
facility in the district weighs strongly in favor of finding a regular and established place of 
business” and that “[f]acts supporting a physical presence could also include the presence of 
equipment or infrastructure that is owned (or leased) by a defendant and used to provide 
services to customers.”). 
107 Id. at 797-98 (discussing that a defendant that “accept[s] a . . . representative’s office as 
one of its own places of business based on, among other things, the advertising that [the] 
defendant permitted regarding that location and the fact that the defendant naturally expected 
customer inquiries to be directed toward its agent there” weighs in favor of finding that a 
defendant has a regular and established place of business in a district). 
108 Raytheon, 258 F. Supp. 3d at 798 (explaining that “[c]ourts have often looked to the 
benefits a defendant has received from its business in a particular district as a factor supporting 
a regular and established place of business, especially where a defendant has generated 
significant revenue from such business.”). 
109 Id. (discussing that courts should look for localized customer support, ongoing 
contractual relationships, or targeted marketing efforts). 
110 Id. at 795, 799. 
111 Id. at 799. 
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in his analysis.112  He merely concluded that venue was proper in the 
case after explaining the four factors of his newly created test.113 
2.  In re Cray, Inc.: The Federal Circuit’s Opinion 
After Judge Gilstrap’s denial of the defendant’s motion to 
dismiss in Raytheon, Cray petitioned the Federal Circuit to issue a writ 
of mandamus to order Judge Gilstrap to transfer the case to a proper 
venue.114  Mandamus is appropriate to decide issues important to 
proper judicial administration, and the Supreme Court has approved 
the use of mandamus to decide a basic and undecided legal question 
when the trial court abused its discretion by applying incorrect law.115  
The court reasoned that Judge Gilstrap misunderstood the scope and 
effect of the Federal Circuit’s decision in In re Cordis.116  There was a 
need for greater uniformity on the issue, and the court saw an 
opportunity to clarify the regular and established place of business 
requirement in this case.117 
The Federal Circuit found that the  
[T]hree general requirements relevant to the inquiry 
[are]: (1) there must be a physical place in the district; 
(2) it must be a regular and established place of 
business; and (3) it must be the place of the 
defendant.118   
 
112 See generally id. at 781. 
113 Raytheon, 258 F. Supp. 3d at 799.  Judge Gilstrap analogized this case to In re Cordis in 
several ways but never applied the four factors to the facts of the case.  See id.  Similar to the 
sales representative in In re Cordis, he explained that the sales executive in this case worked 
exclusively for defendant for several years and did not limit his activity to sales only.  Id. at 
794.  Although the sales executive did not have samples or products stored at his home, he 
could not because the supercomputer systems could take up entire rooms and weigh thousands 
of pounds.  Id. 
114 In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1356. 
115 Id. at 1358-59.  At the outset of the opinion, the court discussed the legally relevant facts 
and explained that mandamus was reserved for exceptional circumstances and appropriately 
issued when there is a usurpation of judicial power or a clear abuse of discretion.  Id. at 1357-
59. 
116 Id. at 1359.  The court acknowledged that the Federal Circuit did not evaluate venue in 
light of the statutory language of § 1400(b) and decided the case based only on its specific 
facts.  Id. 
117 In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1359-60. 
118 Id. at 1360.  The Federal Circuit cautioned district courts to be mindful of the statute’s 
history and to be careful not to conflate the factors for establishing venue in patent cases with 
the factors for establishing personal jurisdiction or general venue.  Id. at 1361 (explaining that 
16
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The pertinent noun in § 1400(b) is “place,” while “regular” and 
“established” are adjectives that modify it.119  The court explained that 
words “of business” indicated the nature and purpose of the “place” 
and the words “the defendant” indicated that the “place” must be the 
defendant’s.120  The court reasoned that § 1400(b) requires that “a 
defendant has” a “place of business” that is “regular” and 
“established.”121 
Regarding its first requirement, the court explained that a 
“place” is “[a] building or a part of a building set apart for any purpose” 
or “quarters of any kind” from which business is conducted.122  The 
“place” component of the definition need not be a fixed, physical 
location in the sense of a formal office or store, but must “be a physical, 
geographical location in the district from which the business of the 
defendant is carried out.”123  A place does not include a virtual space 
or electronic communications from one person to another.124 
Regarding the second requirement, the court defined a business 
as “regular” if it operates in a “steady[,] uniform[,] orderly[, and] 
methodical” manner.125  However, sporadic activity does not establish 
venue.126  The court explained that “[t]he doing of a single act 
pertaining to a particular business will not be considered engaging in 
or carrying on the business; yet a series of such acts would be so 
considered.”127   
The court explained that “established” means that the 
defendant’s place of business is “settle[d] certainly,” “fixed 
permanently,” or “not transient.”128  The court also explained that a 
defendant only has a temporary presence in a district when it 
 
the regular and established place of business standard requires more than the minimum 
contacts necessary for establishing personal jurisdiction or for satisfying the doing business 
standard of the general venue provision). 
119 Id. at 1361-62. 
120 Id. at 1362. 
121 In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1362.  
122 Id. 
123 Id. (quoting In re Cordis, 769 F.2d at 737).  See discussion of In re Cordis supra Section 
IV(A). 
124 In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1362. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. at 1363.  To make “permanent” clearly accords with the “main purpose” identified 
in the predecessor statute’s legislative history.  In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1363. 
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semiannually displays its products at a trade show.129  On the other 
hand, a business’s five-year continuous presence in the district satisfies 
the established requirement for venue purposes.130  While a business 
can move its location, it must be stable for a meaningful period.131 
Regarding the third requirement, the court articulated that the 
“place of business” must be of the defendant, not solely a place of the 
defendant’s employee.132  Since employees can freely move their 
homes out of the district without the defendant’s approval, the 
defendant must establish or ratify the employee’s place as defendant’s 
place of business.133  Relevant considerations include whether the 
defendant owns, leases or exercises control over the place.134  Other 
factors that might satisfy this requirement include whether the 
defendant conditioned employment on an employee’s continued 
residence in the district or whether the employee stores materials at the 
place to allow distribution or sale from there.135   
The court adopted the second factor of Judge Gilstrap’s venue 
test136 and noted that an important consideration is how the defendant 
represents itself in the district.137  The defendant’s marketing or 
advertising activities may also be relevant, but only to the extent that 
it indicates that the defendant itself holds a place of business in the 
district.138  The court opined that the mere fact that a defendant 
advertised a place of business or set up an office is not itself sufficient; 
the defendant must take an extra step and actually engage in business 
from that location.139  In addition, other relevant factors include 
whether the defendant lists the alleged place of business on a website, 
in a telephone or other directory, or places its name on a sign associated 
 
129 Id. (explaining the holding in Knapp–Monarch Co. v. Casco Prods. Corp., 342 F.2d 622, 
625 (7th Cir. 1965)). 
130 Id. (explaining the holding in Remington Rand Bus. Serv. v. Acme Card Sys. Co., 71 
F.2d 628, 629 (4th Cir. 1934)). 
131 Id. 
132 Id. 
133 In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1363. 
134 Id. 
135 Id.  
136 The second factor of Judge Gilstrap’s venue test turned on defendant’s representations 
that it has a presence in the district.  Raytheon, 258 F. Supp. 3d at 797-98. 
137 In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1363.  See discussion of Judge Gilstrap’s test supra Section 
IV(B)(1). 
138 In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1363. 
139 Id. 
18
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with the building itself.140  Another consideration may be the nature 
and activity of the alleged place of business in the district in 
comparison with that of defendant’s other places of business in other 
venues.141  
In applying the court’s definitions to this case, the court turned 
to the third requirement that the place of business be of the defendant 
and not the defendant’s employee.142  The court found that the sales 
executive’s home was not Cray’s place of business because there was 
no indication that Cray owned, leased, or rented any portion of the 
sales executive’s homes in the Eastern District of Texas, played a part 
in selecting the place’s location, stored inventory or conducted 
demonstrations there, or conditioned the sales executive’s employment 
on an Eastern District of Texas location.143  Therefore, the court held 
that venue did not exist under § 1400(b) because the facts, taken as a 
whole, did not support a finding that Cray maintained a place of 
business in the Eastern District of Texas.144 
The Federal Circuit used a clear abuse of discretion standard of 
review instead of a de novo standard because Cray petitioned the 
Federal Circuit to issue a writ of mandamus to order the Eastern 
District of Texas to transfer the case to a proper venue.145  Although 
the court defined several terms of the statute, such as “place,” 
“regular,” and “established,” the court failed to articulate specific 
factual considerations that are relevant for each of these elements of 
the venue statute.146  For example, regarding the first requirement, the 
court did not define a virtual space or discuss any relevant factual 
considerations for determining whether a place of business is virtual or 
physical.147  In addition, regarding the second requirement, the court 
did not discuss any relevant facts that courts should consider when 
determining whether the place of business is “regular” or 
 
140 Id. at 1363-64. 
141 Id. at 1364 (explaining that “we do not suggest that district courts must scrutinize the 
nature and activity of the alleged place of business to make relative value judgments on the 
different types of business activity conducted therein. Rather, a relative comparison of the 
nature and activity may reveal, for example, that a defendant has a business model whereby 
many employees’ homes are used by the business as a place of business of the defendant.”). 
142 Id. at 1364. 
143 In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1365. 
144 Id. at 1366. 
145 Id. at 1359.  The procedural posture of In re Cray was similar to the procedural posture 
in In re Cordis.  See discussion of In re Cordis supra Section IV(A). 
146 See In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1364-65. 
147 See id. 
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“established.”148  In fact, the court separately defined the terms 
“regular” and “established,” but did not explain factual considerations 
to determine whether a place of business is “regular” as opposed to 
“established.”149  Courts often combined these two factual inquiries 
even though the two terms have different meanings.150  It would have 
been very helpful for the court to apply its newly defined requirements 
to the facts of the case.  However, because the court focused primarily 
on the third requirement, the court left open several gaps in the 
standards that courts should apply for determining whether a defendant 
has a regular and established place of business in a judicial district.151 
V.  DEFINING A “PHYSICAL PLACE OF BUSINESS” 
As the Federal Circuit discussed in In re Cray, the first 
requirement is that there must be a physical place of business in the 
district.152  Although the court discussed this requirement, it did not 
discuss relevant facts that courts could use to determine whether a 
defendant’s presence in the district meets the physical place of 
business requirement.153  To determine whether a defendant has a 
physical place of business in a district, courts should consider whether 
a defendant operates solely through virtual means.154  Courts should 
also consider whether a defendant has a stand-alone business office in 
the district155 or whether a defendant employs a secretarial service in 
the district.156  On the other hand, whether a defendant registers as a 
foreign corporation or appoints an agent to accept service of process 
should not be considered.157  This section will analyze and discuss 
factors that courts should consider to determine whether a defendant 
has a physical place of business in a district. 
 
148 See id. 
149 See id. 
150 See discussion of the factual inquiries infra Sections VI and VII. 
151 See generally In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1355. 
152 Id. at 1360. 
153 See id.; see also discussion of the shortcomings of In re Cray supra Section IV(B)(2). 
154 See discussion of this consideration infra Section V(A). 
155 See discussion of this consideration infra Section V(B). 
156 See discussion of this consideration infra Section V(C). 
157 See discussion of this consideration infra Section V(D). 
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A.  Businesses Operating Solely through Virtual Means 
In Talsk Research Inc. v. Evernote Corp.,158 the court held that 
the defendant did not have a physical place of business in the district 
because its only interaction with the district was by selling its software 
products over the internet through virtual stores, such as Google Play 
and the Apple App Store, rather than in a physical retail store.159  
Although the court in Talsk provided little reasoning to support its 
finding,160 the case indicates that a defendant that sells products over 
the internet does not have a physical place of business because virtual 
stores, such as Google Play and the Apple App Store, are not 
“building[s]” or “quarters of any kind” from which a defendant 
conducts business as required by the Federal Circuit’s definition of the 
term “place.”161 
For clarification, courts should define virtual space as a 
medium located in no particular geographical location used to conduct 
business.162  This definition comports with Congress’s intent because 
it makes the virtual space definition more exact, specific and 
unambiguous.163  Furthermore, it coincides with the Federal Circuit’s 
requirement that the place of business must “be a physical, 
geographical location in the district from which the business of the 
defendant is carried out.”164  By using this definition of virtual space, 
patent trolls can be restricted from bringing suit against a defendant in 
a district based only on the defendant’s virtual presence in the district, 
 
158 No. 16-CV-2167, 2017 WL 4269004 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 26, 2017). 
159 Id. at *2.  See also Patent Holder LLC v. Lone Wolf Distribs., Inc., No. 17-23060-Civ-
Scola, 2017 WL 5032989, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 2, 2017) (rejecting plaintiff’s argument that 
the defendant’s dealers in the district constituted defendant’s physical place of business 
because the dealers sign up online and their places of business are the defendant’s). 
160 Talsk, 2017 WL 4269004, at *2-5. 
161 See id. at *2.  See also In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1362. 
162 See Schnell, 365 U.S. at 264; see also Reno v. A.C.L.U., 521 U.S. 844, 851 (1997) 
(explaining the definition of cyberspace). 
163 For example, if a court finds that a defendant sells products through a physical store, 
then the court can refer to a physical, tangible place of business.  If a court finds that a 
defendant sells products through a medium located in no particular geographical location, such 
as Google Play or the Apple App Store, then the court can determine that the defendant 
conducts business through a virtual space.  See Talsk, 2017 WL 4269004, at *2. 
164 In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1362 (quoting In re Cordis, 769 F.2d at 737).  See discussion of 
In re Cordis supra Section IV(A).  The current distinction between virtual space and physical 
location promotes the goals of patent law because courts can more easily define the exact 
limits of a physical place of business.  By doing so, courts can more uniformly determine 
whether a defendant has a physical place of business in the district, which limits a party’s 
ability to forum shop for a favorable forum. 
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such as the defendant’s online advertising and online stores.165 Such a 
restriction eliminates a patent troll’s ability to bring suit in any district 
in which a defendant could be served, which directly supports the 
intent that Congress had when it enacted the patent venue statute.166  In 
addition, by using this definition of virtual space, courts can uniformly 
decide patent venue disputes dealing with virtual spaces, thereby 
limiting a patent troll’s ability to use forum shopping as a litigation 
weapon.  By limiting forum shopping, companies can allocate 
resources towards fostering innovation instead of defensive litigation 
strategies, which directly comports with Congress’s goal for 
implementing the patent system.167   
The distinction between physical and virtual spaces is still 
viable considering that developments in technology over the last few 
decades, including computer enhancements and widespread internet 
use, have changed the way society communicates and conducts 
business.168  In Lites Out, LLC v. OutdoorLink, Inc.,169 the plaintiff 
filed a patent infringement suit against the defendant in the Eastern 
District of Texas.170  Defendant sold surveillance computers to 
billboard owners to track billboard structural integrity and detect 
defects as they arose.171  The surveillance computers wirelessly 
reported wear-and-tear to the defendant, which enabled the defendant 
to oversee and control billboards across large areas.172  The plaintiff 
argued that the defendant maintained a commercial presence in the 
Eastern District of Texas sufficient for patent venue purposes because 
the defendant controlled nearly two thousand billboards and used 
wireless communication to control light, voltage, outage notifications, 
and power restoration of the billboards through the surveillance 
computers.173  In rejecting the plaintiff’s argument, the court reasoned 
that the defendant’s physical offices were located outside of the district 
 
165 See Talsk, 2017 WL 4269004, at *2. 
166 See In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1361.  See also discussion of Congress’s intent when it 
enacted § 1400(b) supra Section III. 
167 See Heinecke, supra note 2. 
168 See Brianne M. Sullenger, Telecommuting: A Reasonable Accommodation Under the 
Americans With Disabilities Act as Technology Advances, 19 REGENT U. L. REV. 537, 537 
(2007). 
169 No. 4:17-CV-00192, 2017 WL 5068348 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 2, 2017). 
170 Id. at *1. 
171 Id. at *2. 
172 Id. (discussing that the defendant monitored about two thousand billboards through 
nearly one thousand surveillance computers in the district). 
173 Id. at *4. 
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and that the defendant did not have facilities or property in the 
district.174  Although the defendant monitored and controlled many 
billboards in the district through its surveillance computers, the court 
opined that this activity in the district constituted a virtual space.175  
Therefore, the distinction between physical and virtual space is still 
viable because some businesses can operate from virtual spaces, such 
as the defendant in this case.176 
B.  Stand-Alone Offices and Secretarial Services 
In Regents of the University of Minnesota v. Gilead Sciences, 
Inc.,177 the defendant’s employees worked in the field visiting 
healthcare providers about defendant’s products and drug therapies.178  
In determining whether the defendant had a physical place of business 
in the district, the court considered whether the defendant used its 
employees’ homes to store literature or products or whether the homes 
functioned as distribution centers to store inventory.179  The court also 
considered whether the defendant employed a secretarial service in the 
district.180  The court found that the defendant did not have a physical 
place of business in the district because the defendant did not work 
from a stand-alone office, store literature or products in its employees’ 
homes, or employ a secretarial service in the district.181 
If a defendant operates from a stand-alone office, the analysis 
is simplified because a court can attach the physical place of business 
requirement to the stand-alone office.182  However, when a defendant 
does not operate from a stand-alone office, a court must find a place to 
which to attach the physical place of business requirement, such as an 
employee’s home or a secretarial service’s place of business.183  If 
 
174 Lites Out, 2017 WL 5068348, at *4. 
175 Id. 
176 See id. at *2. 
177 No. 16-CV-2915 (SRN/HB), 2017 WL 4773150 (D. Minn. October 20, 2017). 
178 Id. at *2. 
179 Id. at *5 (citing In re Cordis, 769 F.2d at 735). 
180 Id. 
181 Id. at *6. 
182 See generally Symbology Innovations, LLC v. Lego Sys., Inc., No. 2:17–cv–86, 2017 
WL 4324841 (E.D. Va. Sept. 28, 2017) (explaining that the defendant’s subsidiary had a retail 
store in the district). 
183 See In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1360.  Under this analysis, the court must consider whether 
the defendant’s employee’s home amounts to the place of business of the defendant itself, 
which is the third requirement that the Federal Circuit discussed in In re Cray.  Id. 
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venue policy did not allow courts to attach the physical place of 
business requirement to such places, then a defendant could hide 
behind its employees’ homes or secretarial service to avoid being 
subject to litigation in a district.  Although a defendant might operate 
solely from its employees’ homes or secretarial service’s place of 
business, venue policy should not enable a business to operate 
vicariously through its employees’ homes.  Therefore, to determine 
whether a defendant has a physical place of business in a district, courts 
should first consider whether the defendant operates from a stand-
alone office.184  In such cases where the defendant operates from its 
employee’s home or secretarial service’s place of business, courts 
should consider whether such places constitute the defendant’s 
physical place of business as analyzed under the third requirement of 
the Federal Circuit’s test in In re Cray.185 
Companies that have at least one stand-alone office in a judicial 
district should be aware that such offices subject them to the wrath of 
the dreaded patent troll.186  Companies that have their employees work 
from home or that utilize a secretarial service located in a judicial 
district should be aware that such physical locations might satisfy the 
“regular and established place of business” requirement, thereby 
permitting a patent troll to bring suit in the judicial district.  These 
physical locations satisfy the physical place of business requirement of 
the Federal Circuit’s definition from In re Cray.187  However, courts 
might not consider these locations the defendant’s place of business as 
required by the Federal Circuit’s definition in In re Cray.188  Although 
this analysis might disfavor defendants, the Federal Circuit has found 
that such physical locations comport with Congress’s intent when it 
enacted the patent venue statute.189  This analysis provides courts with 
a platform for uniformly applying patent venue law, which can help 
courts disarm the patent trolls and prevent them from forum shopping 
for favorable forums, thereby fostering innovation. 
 
184 See Regents, 2017 WL 4773150, at *6. 
185 See discussion of this requirement in In re Cray supra Section IV(B)(2); see also 
discussion of this requirement infra Section VIII. 
186 See 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (2016).  These offices are physical, and courts can find them to 
be regular and established depending on the circumstances. 
187 An employee’s home and a secretarial service’s place of business can be considered 
“building[s] or a part of building set apart for any purpose” or “quarters of any kind” as the 
Federal Circuit defined the term “place” in In re Cray.  In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1362. 
188 See id. at 1363. 
189 See generally id. at 1355; In re Cordis, 769 F.2d at 733. 
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C.  Foreign Registration and Registered Agents to Accept 
Service of Process 
In Symbology Innovations, LLC v. Lego Systems, Inc.,190 the 
court did not consider whether the defendant was registered as a 
foreign corporation in the state or whether the defendant appointed a 
registered agent to accept service of process in the state.191  The court 
reasoned that neither fact had any bearing on whether the defendant 
maintained a physical place of business within the district.192  The 
court found that the consideration of the appointed agent was 
“especially inappropriate because the patent venue statute was 
intended to eliminate the abuses engendered by subjecting defendants 
to suit wherever they could be served.”193   
The court’s holding in Symbology not only comports with 
Congress’s intent when it created the patent venue statute, but it also 
comports with Congress’s overall goal for implementing the patent 
system.194  By preventing a patent troll’s ability to bring an 
infringement suit in any district where a defendant could be served, 
courts can limit the dreaded troll’s ability to forum shop for any forum 
in which the defendant has merely registered as a foreign corporation 
or registered agents to accept service of process.  By limiting the troll’s 
ability to forum shop, companies can allocate resources on research 
and development, thereby fostering innovation.195  
 
190 No. 2:17–cv–86, 2017 WL 4324841 (E.D. Va. Sept. 28, 2017).  The defendant was 
registered as a foreign corporation in Virginia and appointed a registered agent to accept 
service of process in Virginia.  Id. at *9.  The plaintiff argued that the courts should consider 
these factors.  Id.  The plaintiff also argued that the defendant owned and operated three retail 
stores in the district at issue.  Id. at *10.  However, the court found that the defendant did not 
own and operate the retail stores but that the defendant’s parent company, Lego Retail Brand, 
owned and operated the stores.  Id. 
191 Symbology, 2017 WL 4324841, at *9. 
192 Id. 
193 Id.  See also BillingNetwork Patent, Inc. v. Modernizing Med., Inc., 2017 WL 5146008, 
at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 6, 2017) (explaining that “a defendant [] registered to do business in a 
particular state has no bearing on whether it has the requisite ‘physical place’ of business in 
the state, let alone in a particular judicial district.”).  Perhaps a party could argue that the 
defendant’s foreign registration represents that the defendant conducts business in the district, 
but this argument likely has no merit because the party is conflating the issue of venue with 
personal jurisdiction.  See In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1361. 
194 See U.S. CONST. art. 1 § 8, cl. 8. 
195 See Heinecke, supra note 2. 
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VI.  DEFINING A “REGULAR PLACE OF BUSINESS” 
Regarding the second requirement of the Federal Circuit’s 
requirements, the Federal Circuit defined the terms “regular” and 
“established” and explained that the two terms have different 
meanings.196  However, most courts analyze both requirements using 
the same facts without explaining whether their analysis pertains to the 
regular place of business requirement or the established place of 
business requirement.197  Courts make it difficult to ascertain whether 
they are analyzing the regular or established requirement of the Federal 
Circuit’s test because they combine the analysis for the two different 
requirements.198  Instead, courts should separately analyze the regular 
requirement and the established requirement because the two terms 
have different meanings.199 Therefore, this Note separates the factual 
consideration for the regular requirement and the established 
requirement.  To determine whether a defendant has a regular place of 
business in a district, a court should consider how long the defendant 
has spent in the district as well as how frequently the defendant comes 
to the district.200  This section will discuss and analyze facts that courts 
should consider when determining whether a defendant has a regular 
place of business in a district.  
A.  Defendant’s Time Spent in the District 
In Phillips v. Baker,201 the defendants allegedly infringed 
plaintiff’s patent when they used plaintiff’s patented apparatus to 
complete precooling services for agricultural shippers.202  In many 
 
196 See In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1360. 
197 See id. at 1364-65. 
198 See Regents, 2017 WL 4773150, at *5-6 (explaining that even though the defendant 
employed a sales force of approximately a dozen people over a two-year period in the district, 
the court found that the defendant’s presence in the district was not regular and established 
because the physical location of the sales force was not fixed permanently).  The court in 
Regents combined the “regular” and “established” requirements of the second requirement and 
did not discuss whether the two-year period was sufficient for a court to consider it regular.  
See id. 
199 See In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1362-63 (defining regular as “‘steady[,] uniform[,] orderly[, 
and] methodical’ manner” and defining established as “settle[d] certainly, or fix[ed] 
permanently”).  Courts should split the analysis to avoid redundancy and conflating the 
requirements of each term because the Federal Circuit has defined the terms separately. 
200 See discussion of these factors infra Sections VI(A)-(B). 
201 121 F.2d 752 (9th Cir. 1941). 
202 Id. at 754. 
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widely separated agricultural districts in the United States, the shippers 
needed defendants’ services for only a few weeks of the year.203  The 
defendants travelled from one agricultural district to another each 
season to secure business at the shippers’ premises and perform the 
precooling operations.204  Upon procurement of a contract, defendants 
installed the patented apparatus to perform the precooling service and 
then removed it once it finished the service.205  The court reasoned that 
the defendants merely conducted the precooling services on a box car 
temporarily standing at a railroad siding, whereby the car was there 
one day and gone the next.206  The court found that the shippers’ 
premises constituted a temporary place of business and was just a 
location for a particular transaction.207 
The Ninth Circuit’s holding in Phillips comports with the 
Federal Circuit’s definition of regular.208  The defendant’s presence at 
the shippers’ premises was merely sporadic and temporary; it was not 
steady, uniform, orderly, or methodical as required by the Federal 
Circuit’s definition.209  One might argue that the defendant’s presence 
in the district each season was a steady, uniform, orderly, and 
methodical presence because the defendants came back each season.  
However, this argument would likely fail because the defendants could 
have been in the district only once on any given day in any given 
season, which indicates that the defendant’s presence in the district 
was sporadic, temporary, unsteady, disorderly, and unmethodical.210  
However, if the defendant was in the district each season for days, 
weeks, or months at a time, perhaps the defendant’s presence was more 
than sporadic or temporary and thus orderly, uniform, and methodical.  
 
203 Id. 
204 Id. 
205 Id. 
206 Phillips, 121 F.2d at 756 (explaining that the place of business was where the business 
was carried on regularly, not merely temporarily, or for some special work or particular 
transaction). 
207 Id. 
208 See In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1362. 
209 See id. 
210 In fact, this argument failed in Phillips.  Phillips, 121 F.2d at 756.  The “[a]ppellants 
complain[ed] that from an equitable standpoint[,] judgment in [the] case should be in their 
favor because the appellees ‘jump[ed] about the country like fleas, and nowhere in the record 
of [the] case or elsewhere [was] there a statement which would [have bound] them in a 
substitute action as to where, if anywhere, a suit against them [could have been] maintained.’”  
Id. 
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Therefore, courts should consider the amount of time that a defendant 
spends in the district over a period of years.211   
In Precision Fabrics Group, Inc. v. Tietex International, 
Ltd.,212 the defendant manufactured and sold a broad range of fabrics 
nationwide, including some using plaintiff’s patented flame-retardant 
fabric.213  The plaintiff argued that the defendant had a regular place 
of business because the defendant’s regional sales manager “lived and 
worked out of the same home office located within the district for a 
period of over twenty years, using part of his home as a sales office.”214  
Although the court opined that it was highly doubtful that the 
defendant had a physical, regular or established place of business in 
the district, the court focused the entirety of its analysis on the third 
requirement of the venue test, which asks whether the place of business 
is that of the defendant’s and not the defendant’s employee.215  
However, in contrast to this court’s analysis, courts have considered a 
twenty-year presence in a district to constitute a regular place of 
business for venue purposes.216  The employee’s presence in the 
district in Precision seems to be regular because it was steady, orderly, 
uniform, and methodical as required by the Federal Circuit.217  
Therefore, the court in Precision should have found that the 
employee’s presence in the district was at least regular. 
The court in Regents did not focus any of its analysis on the 
regular place of business requirement.218  The court merely noted that 
the defendant employed a sales force of approximately a dozen people 
over at least a two-year period, but did not analyze this fact regarding 
the regular place of business requirement.219  The court found that the 
defendant did not have a regular and established place of business 
because the physical location of the sales force was not permanently 
fixed.220  Similar to the court in Precision, this court focused its 
 
211 Courts should determine whether a defendant’s presence in a district is temporary on a 
case-by-case basis because a bright-line test might not be fair and equitable in all cases. 
212 No. 1:13-cv-645, 2017 WL 5176355 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 7, 2017). 
213 Id. at *2. 
214 Id. at *11. 
215 Id. 
216 See Stiegele v. Jacques Kreisler Mfg. Corp., 213 F. Supp. 494, 495 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) 
(holding that venue was proper in the district for a defendant that maintained an office in the 
district for twenty years). 
217 See In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1362. 
218 Regents, 2017 WL 4773150, at *5-6. 
219 Id. 
220 Id. at *6. 
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analysis on the established place of business requirement instead of the 
regular place of business requirement.221  However, the court 
acknowledged that the period of the defendant’s alleged presence in 
the district is dispositive for a regular place of business analysis.222  
Therefore, courts should consider the amount of time that a defendant 
spends in a district to determine if its presence is regular. 
By analyzing the defendant’s time spent in the judicial district, 
defendants that operate for a short period of time in a judicial district, 
perhaps to perform a precooling service,223 need not surrender to the 
dreaded patent trolls’ intimidation tactics.  By avoiding the troll’s 
tactics, defendants can spend money on research and development as 
opposed to litigation strategies, which supports Congress’s intent when 
it enacted the patent venue statute.224 The time that a defendant has 
spent in a district can be a fact-sensitive inquiry,225 and each case 
should be dealt with on a case-by-case basis.  By analyzing the 
defendant’s time spent in the district, courts can more uniformly define 
the extent to which a defendant has a regular place of business in a 
district, thereby limiting a patent troll’s ability to forum shop for 
favorable forums.  Such a limitation on forum shopping allows 
companies to allocate resources to fostering innovation as opposed to 
defending against the litigious patent trolls.226 
B.  Frequency of Defendant’s Presence 
In Lites Out, the defendant sold surveillance computers to 
billboard owners, such as plaintiff, to track billboard structural 
integrity and detect defects as they arose.227  The plaintiff argued that 
the residences of the defendant’s employees and independent 
contractors constituted regular and established places of business.228  
The court rejected the argument because none of the defendant’s 
employees or independent contractors resided in the district.229  In fact, 
 
221 Id. at *5-6. 
222 Id. 
223 See Phillips, 121 F.2d at 756. 
224 See In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1355. 
225 See generally Phillips, 121 F.2d at 752; Precision, 2017 WL 5176355, at *1. 
226 See Heinecke, supra note 2. 
227 Lites Out, 2017 WL 5068348, at *2.  See discussion of the facts of the case supra Section 
V(A). 
228 Lites Out, 2017 WL 5068348, at *4. 
229 Id. 
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the court found that one independent contractor spent most of the year 
outside of the district at issue.230  The court concluded that the 
defendant did not have a regular place of business under § 1400(b) 
because the independent contractor was not frequently in the district.231 
Similarly, in Phillips, the defendants travelled from one 
agricultural district to another each season to secure business at the 
shippers’ premises and perform precooling operations for the 
shippers.232  The court reasoned that the defendants merely conducted 
the precooling services on a boxcar temporarily standing at a railroad 
siding.233  The court found that the shippers’ premises constituted a 
temporary place of business and was just a location for a particular 
transaction because the defendant was within the district for only a few 
weeks per year.234 
Courts should consider the frequency with which a defendant 
operates a place of business in a district because it shows whether the 
place of business is steady, uniform, orderly, and methodical, which 
comports with the Federal Circuit’s definition of regular.235  For 
example, some businesses might not operate every single day within a 
district.  These businesses might not necessarily be sporadically or 
temporarily in the district because they might operate for a week each 
month.  Operating twelve times each year may make their conduct in 
the district regular because it is steady, uniform, orderly, and 
methodical in nature.236  If courts determine that these businesses do 
not have a regular place of business in a district, then this determination 
might entice other businesses to operate in a similar manner to avoid 
being subject to litigation in the district.  However, venue policy 
should not enable businesses to change their business practices to 
avoid being subject to litigation in a particular district.  Therefore, 
courts should consider the frequency with which a defendant operates 
 
230 Id. 
231 Id.  The court relied mostly on the fact that the surveillance computers constituted virtual 
spaces.  Id. at *4.  See also CAO Lighting, Inc. v. Light Efficient Design, No. 4:16-cv-00482-
DCN, 2017 WL 4556717, at *3 (D. Idaho October 11, 2017) (reasoning that the defendant’s 
sales representatives were not based in the district and visited it only occasionally). 
232 Phillips, 121 F.2d at 754.  See discussion of the facts of the case supra Section VI(A). 
233 Phillips, 121 F.2d at 756 (explaining that the place of business was where the business 
was carried on regularly, not merely temporarily, or for some special work or particular 
transaction).  The court also explained that the box was there one day and gone the next.  Id. 
234 Id. 
235 See In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1362. 
236 See id. 
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a place of business in a district to determine whether the defendant’s 
place of business is regular.237 
VII.  DEFINING AN “ESTABLISHED PLACE OF BUSINESS” 
In In re Cray, the Federal Circuit explained that a business is 
“established” if it is “not transient,” “settle[d] certainly, or fix[ed] 
permanently.”238  However, the court did not discuss factors to 
determine whether a defendant has an established place of business in 
the district.239  In making this determination, courts should consider 
the defendant’s revenue generated in the district, the time that the 
defendant has spent in the district, and the number of employees that 
the defendant has employed in the district.240  On the other hand, courts 
should not consider whether the defendant’s employees service 
customers at the customer’s location241 or whether a defendant’s place 
of business is permanently fixed to a physical location as being 
determinative.242  This section will discuss and analyze facts that courts 
should consider when determining whether a defendant has an 
established place of business in a district. 
A.  Fixed Permanence 
In Regents, the court explained that the defendant’s place of 
business was not established because the defendant’s sales force of 
approximately a dozen people over at least a two-year period was not 
permanently fixed to a physical location.243  However, by requiring a 
defendant’s place of business to be physical, the court conflated the 
two separate requirements that the place of business be “physical” as 
opposed to “established.”  Although a physical location is likely a good 
indication that the business has an established place of business in a 
district, courts should not rely on this fact to be determinative.  For 
example, a business’s employees could live in one district and work in 
 
237 See Phillips, 121 F.2d at 756. 
238 In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1363. 
239 See discussion of the shortcomings of this case supra Section IV(B)(2). 
240 See discussion of these factors infra Section VII(B), VII(E). 
241 See discussion of this factor infra Section VII(C). 
242 See discussion of this factor infra Section VII(A). 
243 Regents, 2017 WL 4773150, at *6. 
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a different district.244  If courts adopted the reasoning in Regents, then 
the business would only have an established place of business in the 
district where the employees live because the employees are 
permanently fixed to a physical location there, the physical location 
being their homes.245  However, venue should be determined based on 
a defendant’s place of business in the district where its employees 
work.  In this example, the defendant might not necessarily have a 
physical place of business in the district where the employees work, 
but the physical place of business requirement should be evaluated 
using the law set forth in In re Cray and the factors set forth in Section 
V.246  Therefore, although courts require that a defendant have a 
physical place of business in a district for venue purposes, courts 
should not rely solely on a physical place of business to determine 
whether a defendant has an established place of business in a district.247 
B.  Revenue Generated in District 
Several courts have determined that revenue generated from a 
district should not be part of the venue analysis.248  In Regents and 
CAO Lighting, rather than rejecting the plaintiffs’ arguments that the 
defendant had an established place of business from the revenue that it 
generated in the district, the courts found that this revenue did not 
create established places of business in each case.249  In Regents, the 
court explained that “the Federal Circuit was apparently unpersuaded 
that even higher sales figures than the amounts noted here, indicated a 
regular and established place of business.”250  In CAO Lighting, instead 
of rejecting outright the plaintiff’s argument regarding the defendant’s 
 
244 For venue purposes, the employee’s residence is important because courts often consider 
whether the employee’s home constitutes the defendant’s place of business.  See In re Cray, 
871 F.3d at 1363.  See also discussion of the Federal Circuit’s third requirement in In re Cray 
supra Section IV(B)(2). 
245 This reasoning does not comport with the venue statute itself because the pertinent 
“place” for venue purposes is the place of business and not the place of the employees.  See In 
re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1364. 
246 See discussion of the physical place of business requirement supra Section V. 
247 See Regents, 2017 WL 4773150, at *6. 
248 See Patent Holder, 2017 WL 5032989, at *6 (explaining that revenue derived from the 
forum has no bearing on whether § 1400(b)’s physical place requirements are met).  See also 
Symbology, 2017 WL 4324841, at *9.  
249 Regents, 2017 WL 4773150, at *2; CAO Lighting, 2017 WL 4556717, at *3. 
250 Regents, 2017 WL 4773150, at *6.  The court did not discuss what the sales figures 
generated from the district were.  Id. 
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revenue generated in the district, the court acknowledged that this 
revenue did not change the analysis and was of little significance.251 
Courts should analyze the defendant’s sales figures generated 
from the district because some businesses’ entire sales force consists 
of sales representatives working from home offices.  Although a sales 
representative’s home might not amount to a place of business of the 
defendant,252 the sales representative could potentially generate a large 
portion of the business’s revenue from that district.  As long as a sales 
representative continues to generate significant revenue from a district, 
courts should consider the sales representative settled certainly and 
fixed permanently there.253  If venue policy does not allow courts to 
analyze the revenue that a defendant generates in a district, then a 
defendant could hide behind its sales force in the district to avoid being 
subject to litigation there.  Venue policy should not enable a business 
to conduct business vicariously through its sales force.  Therefore, 
courts should consider the defendant’s revenue generated from the 
district. 
Although some courts do not analyze a defendant’s revenue 
generated in a district,254 companies should still be aware that, whether 
or not courts agree, such generation falls within the Federal Circuit’s 
definition of “established” in In re Cray.255  Although these defendants 
might not necessarily have a physical place of business in the district, 
a defendant’s revenue generation in a district can be construed as the 
defendant’s intent to be settled certainly or fixed permanently there.256  
In such circumstances, companies should be particularly careful in 
setting up physical places of business so that they do not 
unintentionally expose themselves to patent infringement litigation, 
especially litigation against a dreaded patent troll.  
 
251 CAO Lighting, 2017 WL 4556717, at *3. 
252 See discussion of the employee’s home constituting the defendant’s place of business 
supra Section IV(B)(2) and infra Section VIII. 
253 See In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1363. 
254 See Patent Holder, 2017 WL 5032989, at *6.  See also Symbology, 2017 WL 4324841, 
at *9. 
255 See In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1363 (defining established as settled certainly or fixed 
permanently). 
256 See id. 
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C.  Service at Customer’s Location 
In Regents, the court found that the defendant did not have an 
established place of business because the defendant’s employees 
serviced customers at the customer’s location.257  Although the 
defendant’s employees serviced customers in the district through visits 
to healthcare facilities or clinical trial facilities, the court reasoned that 
the “servicing occur[red] at the customer’s physical place, not 
[defendant’s].”258  Therefore, the court found that the defendant did not 
have an established place of business in the district.259  However, the 
court’s analysis of this fact under the established requirement seems 
flawed. 
Even though a defendant’s employees might service customers 
at the customer’s locations, the defendant might have a non-transient, 
certainly settled, and permanently fixed presence in a district directly 
through its employees’ conduct.260  For example, in Regents, the 
defendant’s employees visited healthcare facilities and clinical trial 
facilities to work with customers.261  The fact that the defendant’s 
employees go to the customer’s place instead of the customers going 
to the defendant’s employees’ place should have no bearing on the 
established requirement.  Rather, courts should consider whether the 
services performed in the district are non-transient, certainly settled, 
and permanently fixed in the district consistent with the Federal 
Circuit’s definition in In re Cray.262  For example, if for one year the 
defendant serviced all customers in the district from the customer’s 
physical place and the next year serviced no customers in the district, 
then a court should find that the defendant’s business was not 
established in the district because the defendant left the district and, 
therefore, its presence is certainly not fixed permanently.  Therefore, 
courts should focus on the transitory nature of the defendant’s place of 
business and not focus on the defendant’s employees servicing 
customers from the customer’s physical place.263  By focusing on the 
transitory nature of the defendant’s place of business, courts can more 
 
257 Regents, 2017 WL 4773150, at *6. 
258 Id. 
259 Id. 
260 See In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1363. 
261 Regents, 2017 WL 4773150, at *2. 
262 See In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1363. 
263 See id. 
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uniformly apply patent venue law, which limits a patent troll’s ability 
to forum shop for a favorable forum.  By limiting their ability to utilize 
forum shopping as a litigation weapon, instead of focusing on 
defensive litigation strategies, companies can spend money on creating 
patented inventions, thereby fostering innovation in accordance with 
Congress’s intent when it established the patent system.264 
D.  Employee or Independent Contractor 
In Talsk, the defendant operated a program in which residents 
of the district, called Community Members, could sell the defendant’s 
product as independent contractors.265  Although the Community 
Members did not receive a salary, the defendant provided financial 
incentives in the form of bonuses to Community Members who 
recommended products in the course of conducting their own 
business.266  The court reasoned that the Community Members’ 
activities on behalf of the defendant were not “sufficiently stable or 
established to be seen as the operation of Defendant’s business in this 
District.”267  The court found that the defendant’s presence was not 
established in the district because the Community Members were 
independent contractors.268  Even if one of the Community Members 
was very successful and the defendant gave substantial bonuses to that 
Community Member, the analysis would not change because the 
defendant lacked the “necessary control over its Community 
Members.”269  If the defendant had paid the Community Members a 
salary, rather than a bonus, then the analysis would change because the 
Community Members could be deemed employees of the defendant.270   
It would be fundamentally unfair to allow patent trolls to bring 
patent infringement suits against defendants in districts where the 
defendant’s only connection is through an independent contractor.  If 
such conduct were permitted, patent trolls could file patent 
infringement suits in any district where a defendant uses any 
independent contractor, which could subject the defendant to patent 
 
264 See Heinecke, supra note 2. 
265 Talsk, 2017 WL 4269004, at *3. 
266 Id. 
267 Id. at *5. 
268 Id. 
269 Id. 
270 Talsk, 2017 WL 4269004, at *3. 
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litigation is an overwhelming number of judicial districts.  This 
exacerbates the problem with patent trolls exploiting the weaknesses 
in the patent system and certainly goes against Congress’s intent of 
limiting patent infringement suits being “brought in any district in 
which the defendant could be served.”271  Moreover, companies would 
be required to allocate an overwhelming amount of resources to 
defensive litigation strategies because of the patent troll’s ability to file 
suit anywhere that the defendant has conducted business with any 
independent contractor.272  Such an allocation of resources can be quite 
expensive, harms innovation273 and directly conflicts with Congress’s 
intent for implementing the patent system.274  Therefore, by 
determining whether a defendant has an employee or an independent 
contractor in a district, courts can more uniformly apply patent venue 
law and restrict a patent troll’s ability to utilize forum shopping as a 
litigation weapon. 
E.  Time Spent and Workforce Present in the District 
In Regents, the defendant employed a sales force of 
approximately a dozen people over at least a two-year period within 
the district.275  The court reasoned that the defendant did not require 
that its employees live in the district and found that the physical 
location of the sales force was not permanently fixed.276  
Consequently, the court found that the physical location of the sales 
force did not constitute an established place of business.277  The court’s 
reliance on the combination of the defendant’s time spent in the district 
and number of employees within the district comports with the Federal 
Circuit’s definition of established.278  Accordingly, the defendant’s 
time spent in the district indicates whether the defendant’s presence in 
the district is settled certainly and fixed permanently.279  In addition, a 
greater number of employees present within the district suggests that 
 
271 In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1361 (quoting Schnell, 365 U.S. at 262). 
272 See Heinecke, supra note 2. 
273 See Heinecke, supra note 2. 
274 See U.S. CONST. art. 1 § 8, cl. 8. 
275 Regents, 2017 WL 4773150, at *6. 
276 Id. 
277 Id. 
278 See In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1363. 
279 See id. 
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the defendant likely intends to establish its business in the district and 
therefore intends to be fixed permanently there.280 
VIII.  DEFINING DEFENDANT’S “PLACE OF BUSINESS” 
In In re Cray, the Federal Circuit articulated that the place of 
business must be of the defendant and not solely a place of the 
defendant’s employee.281  The court indicated that relevant 
considerations include whether the defendant owns or leases the place 
or whether the defendant exercises other attributes of possession or 
control over the place.282  The court also discussed that other 
considerations may satisfy the place of business requirement, such as 
whether the defendant conditioned employment on an employee’s 
continued residence in the district or the employee stores materials at 
the place so that they can be distributed or sold from that location.283  
In In re Cray, the court acknowledged that potential relevant inquiries 
include whether the defendant lists the alleged place of business on a 
website, in a telephone or other directory, or places its name on a sign 
on or associated with the building itself.284  The court indicated that a 
further consideration might be the nature and activity of the alleged 
place of business in the district in comparison with that of defendant’s 
other places of business in other venues.285  This section will discuss 
and analyze other facts that courts should consider when determining 
whether a place of business in a district is the defendant’s.  
These factors from In re Cray, in addition to the several factors 
discussed in this Section, allow courts to more uniformly determine 
whether a place of business is that of the defendant.  By utilizing these 
factors, courts prevent patent trolls from utilizing forum shopping as a 
litigation weapon, thereby discouraging them to continue exploiting 
the weaknesses of the patent system.  Accordingly, companies can 
allocate resources on research and development instead of costly 
litigation practices designed to fend off patent trolls.  By allocating 
resources to research and development, companies can foster 
 
280 See id. 
281 Id. 
282 Id. 
283 In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1363. 
284 Id. at 1364-65. 
285 Id. at 1365. 
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innovation, which supports Congress’s intent for creating the patent 
system in the first place.286  
A.  Storing Products in Employee’s Home 
In In re Cray, Cray’s sales executive did not store petitioner’s 
samples or products in his home.287  The court reasoned that storage 
was not possible because Cray’s supercomputer systems could take up 
entire rooms and weighed several thousand pounds.288  Although a 
defendant’s storing its inventory in its employee’s home favors the 
employee’s home constituting the defendant’s place of business,289 
courts should not treat this fact as being determinative.  If the defendant 
stores its inventory in the employee’s home, then the employee’s home 
likely constitutes the defendant’s place of business.290  However, if the 
defendant cannot store the inventory in its employee’s home because 
of the product’s size or weight, courts should analyze other attributes 
that contribute to the employee’s home constituting the defendant’s 
place of business.291 
B.  Separate Corporate Entities  
In cases where the defendant’s subsidiary conducts business in 
a district, courts should consider whether the subsidiary owns and 
operates its business as a separate corporate entity from the 
defendant.292  For a plaintiff to impute venue onto a defendant through 
a defendant’s subsidiary, courts should inquire whether the defendant 
and its subsidiary lack formal separateness.293  For example, in 
Symbology, because the defendant and its subsidiary in the district kept 
separate general ledgers, prepared their own distinct financial reports, 
 
286 See U.S. CONST. art. 1 § 8, cl. 8. 
287 In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1365. 
288 Id. 
289 See id. 
290 See In re Cordis, 769 F.2d at 737. 
291 See, Regents, 2017 WL 4773150, at *5. 
292 Symbology, 2017 WL 4324841, at *10. 
293 Id. (explaining “when separate, but closely related, corporations are involved . . . the rule 
is similar to that applied for purposes of service of process. So long as a formal separation of 
the entities is preserved, the courts ordinarily will not treat the place of business of one 
corporation as the place of business of the other. On the other hand, if the corporations 
disregard their separateness and act as a single enterprise, they may be treated as one for 
purposes of venue.”). 
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and had separate assets, the court found the defendant and its 
subsidiary were separate corporate entities.294  The court found that the 
subsidiary’s retail stores in the district were not imputable to the 
defendant, and the court held that the place of business in the district 
was not the defendant’s place of business.295  Therefore, in the case of 
a plaintiff’s establishing venue through a defendant’s subsidiary, 
courts should consider whether the subsidiary owns and operates its 
business as a separate corporate entity from the defendant.296 
C.  Worker’s Compensation Insurance Policies 
In BillingNetwork, the plaintiff argued that the even if the 
defendant did not establish its employees’ homes as its own places of 
business, it ratified them as such by designating the homes for purposes 
of worker’s compensation.297  The court reasoned that the argument 
was not persuasive because the listing of the employee’s home address 
on the worker’s compensation insurance policy showed neither that the 
defendant possessed the home, controlled the home, nor held out the 
home as its place of business to the public.298  The court found that the 
listing of the employee’s home for the worker’s compensation 
insurance policy merely recognized that the employee did work for the 
employer at its home.299 
IX.  CONCLUSION 
Courts should continue to disarm patent trolls by uniformly 
applying patent venue law to prevent them from using forum shopping 
as a litigation weapon.  Companies continue to increase spending on 
defensive litigation strategies, which leads to decreased spending on 
research and development.300  This shift in resources harms innovation, 
which frustrates Congress’s goal for implementing the United States 
patent system.301  Although the Federal Circuit’s guidance on venue 
disputes helped district courts apply patent venue law uniformly, the 
 
294 Id. at *11. 
295 Id. 
296 See id. at *10. 
297 BillingNetwork, 2017 WL 5146008, at *3. 
298 Id. 
299 Id. 
300 Heinecke, supra note 2, at 1179-80. 
301 Heinecke, supra note 2, at 1179-80. 
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Federal Circuit left large gaps in its analysis of the requirements.302  
These gaps in the patent venue law have given wide discretion to the 
district courts, and, as a result, the district courts have ruled differently 
on several of the requirements.303  Such varying views and opinions 
enable patent trolls to continue to exploit the weaknesses in the patent 
system and use forum shopping as a litigation advantage.   
By utilizing the factors analyzed in this Note, courts can begin 
to apply patent venue law uniformly to prevent patent trolls from forum 
shopping. Chef from the Disney movie Trolls said, “He who controls 
the trolls controls the kingdom . . . !”304  It is time for our courts to 
control patent trolls by controlling the kingdom, the kingdom being 
patent venue jurisprudence.  It is time for our courts to put an end to 
the forum shopping and extinguish the dreaded troll.  It is time to 
control the kingdom! 
 
 
302 See discussion of the shortcomings of this case supra Section IV(B)(2). 
303 See discussion of the analysis of each requirement supra Sections V-VIII. 
304 KingdomHeartsFan3211, You’re a dude??? – Trolls, YouTube, (June 2, 2017), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vcXQG9IGcP0 
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